Since the Bosman ruling in 1994, research has been undertaken around the various 3 pieces of legislation designed to influence player development and recruitment (for 4 example, Bullough and Mills, 2014; Radoman, 2015; Marcén, 2016) . Other studies 5 have developed the narrative around player migration patterns and national origin 6 T e a m P e r f o r m a n c e M a n a g e m e n t 1 Clubs' approach to meeting quota regulations is a key indicator of the efficacy of the 2 rule, and research in this area is developing. With this in mind, this paper has three 3 aims; (1) to examine the player production data from leagues and individual clubs T e a m P e r f o r m a n c e M a n a g e m e n t 1 playing opportunities, particularly in the last twenty years, have resulted in an 2 enhanced focus on player opportunity. The legislation demonstrates this is a priority 3 area of their mandate to govern the European game. However, exercising power in T e a m P e r f o r m a n c e M a n a g e m e n t 1 played. The results outlined that the more established clubs (i.e. those ever-present in 2 the Premier League since 2006) had a modest output (141 of the 369 players produced) 3 and those players were likely to leave these clubs and play at lower achieving clubs (in 4 terms of league position). This study outlined a level of understanding around the 5 player development structure in England, however in order to provide greater 6 understanding around UEFAs rule, a wider scope is required to include the other main 7 European leagues. Previous authors have identified that Spain, Netherlands, Germany and France have 10 recorded a greater level of appearances and minutes played for their indigenous 11 players, with England and Italy falling behind (Bullough et al, 2016) . In addition, 12 England has been a prominent destination for migrating players both established, via 13 transfers, and through the youth academy system, (Bond et al, 2017; Poli et al, 2016) . European football is structured in a similar way at the elite level, in that most clubs 24 compete in similar sized leagues (n=18-20), with promotion and relegation present, 25 and an allocation of qualification entries for European club competitions (Champions 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 T e a m P e r f o r m a n c e M a n a g e m e n t 1 League and Europa League). This means comparing leagues, and clubs within those 2 leagues, is possible as they are similar in their composition, structure and access to 3 European competition. Despite this, there are differences across the major leagues with 4 regard to the organisational structure and composition of tiered leagues underneath the 5 top division, depending on the rules of that national association. The main difference 6 between associations is the allowances made (or prohibition of) elite clubs' reserve 7 teams (also referred to as 'amateur', 'B', 'II' teams) to play within the same structure as 8 the first team. Within the six major European leagues, four allow it (Spain, Germany, 9 France and Holland); four Spanish clubs also have a third team. Clubs are subject to 10 limits regarding the highest tier of the league pyramid their second team can compete 11 at; Spain (third tier); Netherlands (second tier); France (fourth tier); Germany (third 12 tier). to under 19. Up to four "non-quota" players, limited to one with no age limit, are 22 permitted. Alongside the overall analysis by country and by club, the above dichotomy 23 between league structures forms part of the results section. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 T e a m P e r f o r m a n c e M a n a g e m e n t 1 2
The influence of cultural identity on player behaviour is also important. Studies have 3 shown that certain behaviours and specific traits can be attributable to players from 4 certain countries (Webb & Thelwell, 2015) , and this may include gamesmanship 5 (Triviño, 2012; Berman, 2011 ) simulation (Renden et al., 2014 One notable club in this regard is Athletic Club Bilbao, owned by its members with a 23 (non-written) policy requiring players to be native to the Basque country; where 24 profits are re-invested into the academy system (cantera) underpinned by a philosophy 25 of 'con cantera y afición, no hace falta importación' meaning 'with home grown talent Page 7 of 39  Team Performance Management   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 T e a m P e r f o r m a n c e M a n a g e m e n t 1 and local support, you do not need imports' (Vaczi, 2015) . The focus and resources are 2 placed into sourcing and developing local talent rather than importing them. Athletic
3
Club have a direct supply line into their first team through two routes; fourth tier 4 feeder club CD Basconia and second/third tier Athletic Bilbao B, which are all part of 5 the club structure. The strategy is for players to develop through the feeder teams 6 before making the transition to the first team, which underpins their cultural identity. Chelsea's first team in 2014. This organisational approach is in stark contrast to the 2 philosophy at some other clubs, but has either generated significant commercial Home-grown legislation -consideration of programme theory? 10 UEFA designed the home-grown rule as a response to changing migration patterns and 11 a concern over the ability to protect opportunities for locally trained players (UEFA, 12 2005). However, the structure (and power) in football between governing bodies and 13 clubs is complex. The relationship between UEFA and the clubs has been described as intervention. It can be questioned whether any additionality in the system stems from Programme theory identifies the outcomes pursued, the processes required to achieve 7 them and an assessment of whether the outcomes achieved were generated by the 8 assumed processes (Rogers, 2008) . The UEFA legislation had two clear aims. First 9 was to improve the training of young players and their level of opportunity, and 10 second, was to see an improvement in the competitive balance in Europe (Dalziel et al. (e.g., finances and support) will be allocated or used to generate the desired outputs 19 and outcomes (Weed, 2014) . Coalter (2011) also suggested this should be a framework 20 for analysis rather than a method of delivery.
22
Previous work around the use of programme theory in sport (Coalter, 2007 (Coalter, , 2011 23 Weed, 2014), noted three main concerns. First, there tends to be a focus on outputs not 24 process and outcomes, second, the use of cross-sectional rather than time series data, 25 third, a failure to factor and control dominant variables that are wide in range and Page 10 of 39 Team Performance Management   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 T e a m P e r f o r m a n c e M a n a g e m e n t 1 sometimes conflicting. It could be argued retrospectively that the construction and 2 imposition of UEFAs regulations appears to have a limited theory of change 3 underpinning it. The rationale could also be criticised for (1) focussing on outputs not 4 the process and (2) not controlling dominant variables. execute their own strategy for resource allocation for recruitment, development etc.
13
UEFAs ability to influence the necessary actions required to achieve the desire to 14 increase opportunities, as set out in the rationale for the regulation, therefore, is weak.
16
It is an assumption to suggest that programme theory was not considered in UEFAs 17 design of their home-grown regulations. Programme theory can be used 18 retrospectively to illustrate the expected outcomes i.e. what was meant to happen 19 ( Figure 1 ) with what has actually happened (see results section). This is in-line with 20
Coalter's (2011) suggestion that programme theory should be a framework for analysis 21 rather than a method of delivery. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Previous studies in this area have outlined the different measurement techniques 19 applied to assess playing opportunity, including starting eleven, squad composition, 20 appearances made and minutes played (Gratton and Solberg, 2007; McGovern, 2002; 21 Bullough and Mills 2014; Bullough et. al., 2016) . In order to ensure the most accurate 22 measurement of quantity and quality, the most recent studies have developed to 23 analyse the volume of activity (namely minutes) as the most accurate descriptor of 24 opportunity levels. This allows volume to be aggregated to demonstrate opportunity 25 levels in a more comprehensive way than using the composition of teams/squads and The number of eligible teams in the sample with a second team competing in the 2 professional system varies between nations with England (0 out of 37) and Italy (0/34) 3 not allowing this in their structure. The majority of clubs in the sample from Spain 4 (33/35) and Germany (18/33) have this structure, with France (13/36) and Holland To meet the three aims of the paper (to quantify outputs and investigate league 11 structure in order to inform the discussion on the design of the legislation), playing 12 data from each team in each season was collated and coded using SPSS. The following 13 variables were collated; name, age, nationality, club played for, league played in, 14 academy/academies attended, appearances, minutes played, and international caps 15 (senior and age-group). This data was then categorised subject to key areas of interest 16 (i.e. academy attended, team played for). To meet the aims of the paper, the 17 descriptive statistics function allowed the calculation of whole system outputs (by 18 national association). Subsequently, splitting the file into sub-groups (clubs, season, 19 academy attended) enabled the volume of cumulative playing data, number of players 20 etc. to be quantified. Playing data was then cross-checked to examine whether the 21 academy attended and the club played for matched, in order to determine the rate of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
RESULTS

5
The results section is structured into three areas, first in relation to the whole system, 6 second individual clubs and club types (see Table 1 ), and third, league structure. For 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 almost 85,000 minutes more than the next highest club (Feyenoord, 262, 751) . Only 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (71) are the leading European clubs for player production in the 8 sample timeframe. Table 2 outlines the leading clubs for players produced and minutes 9 played (overall), and also for the clubs providing the most opportunity for their own 10 academy graduates. Four clubs stand out in the sample in terms of producing players; Ajax (99), 16 Feyenoord (71) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 For the volume of minutes played in the six leagues ( occurs) due to three of their stronger clubs in the last ten years (Juventus, Genoa and 21 Napoli) being in this category. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Chelsea's academy graduates had the highest number of under 21 caps for any English As discussed earlier, the presence of second teams in the league structure is not 9 permitted in all leagues, and the player production data can isolate those clubs that 10 have a second team (n = 73) and those that do not (n = 127). Those clubs with a 11 second team in the sample have a greater average number of seasons in the top league 12 (7) compared to those without (5). They have also produced a higher average number 13 of players through their club (21 per club) compared to 12 for clubs with no second 14 team. This difference is also present for the players emerging to play for the same club For those clubs with a second team, there appears to be strength in this structure (i.e.
21
develop players in the same environment to make the transition easier), see The advantages of having a second team include involvement in the club 8 environment/philosophy, access to similar facilities/coaches, potential for smoother 9 transition, familiarity, support, not having to move etc. Although the removal of 10 transfer fees applies to youth teams as well as second teams, critically youth teams do 11 not play in the professional structure in the way B teams do. Culturally, this structure 12 is not followed in England and Italy with a much wider breadth of professional clubs 13 and there are no plans to change this structure. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 T e a m P e r f o r m a n c e M a n a g e m e n t 1 2
The role of UEFA and individual national associations in the process of facilitating 3 indigenous opportunities is reliant on the philosophy and actions of individual 4 clubs/within leagues. The outputs generated outline that the 'direction of travel' over 5 ten seasons is effectively a plateau in terms of volume. This has (as yet) not resulted in 6 UEFA making amendments to the quota rules or tightening regulation (for example, 7 ensuring nationality is a factor in the quota, rewarding clubs with high indigenous 8 outputs). The outputs generated need to be rationalised around the process in which 9 they operate, i.e. where UEFA as the governing body has a weak level of power to The anticipated outcome of a greater number of young indigenous players being given 18 opportunities has only seen a marginal positive benefit, with an average of 325 players 19 debuting per season in the first three years post-legislation, and 370 in the last three 20 years in the sample. The outputs suggest that there has not been a systematic culture 21 change amongst clubs; therefore the anticipated outcome has not been achieved.
22
UEFAs expected outcome of greater opportunity is yet to materialise on a macro level, 23 although there is evidence of some protection of opportunity as there has not been a 24 decline.
25
Page 24 of 39 Team Performance Management   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 T e a m P e r f o r m a n c e M a n a g e m e n t 1 For a young player, it could be argued that the main supply 'should' be through your 2 parent club, however in the modern game this is far from the case, with youth transfers 3 and the role of agents for academy players becoming more prevalent. With scouting 4 networks evolving and widening (Poli et al, 2016; Bond et al, 2016) , making the grade 5 as a professional has arguably never been more competitive. If opportunities for 'local' 6 players are deemed worthy of protecting in the future, stronger regulation may be 7 required to underpin any legislative developments. Some clubs/national associations 8 standout from the sample in terms of outputs, and there appears to be correlations 9 between league outputs and league structures (i.e. second teams in the professional 10 structure), although this is not suggested to be direct causation. The national 11 association with the highest outputs (and also the greatest level of international success 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 T e a m P e r f o r m a n c e M a n a g e m e n t 1 identity and bias, and test the preferences of leaders against reality. For clubs that 2 value commercial advantage and/or short-term transfers in the pursuit of trophies over 3 youth development, UEFA have limited influence on such organisational values. UEFAs ability to control the dominant variables is weak, and this is a prominent issue 4 in terms of its ability to influence the elite clubs and leagues. In addition, the cultural 5 differences between countries outlined earlier (Hofstede, 1980; Ronen and Shenkar, 6 1985) are potentially significant influences on behaviour within clubs. This is not in 7 UEFAs control, and appears to have not been a factor in the design. The data demonstrates there has not been a major cultural or operational change in the 10 first 10 years, albeit with some protection with marginal increases in three countries, 11 and a minority of clubs with higher outputs ( 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 T e a m P e r f o r m a n c e M a n a g e m e n t 1 was accumulated by their academy graduates, the 64 th highest in the sample of 200 2 clubs and 33/51 in category 1. Whether this is this a problem, however, can be debated.
3
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